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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
HOW _._:\_RD G. W ARLEN and 
BARBARA M. W ARLEN, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF. OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY S·TATEMENT 
Case No. 
7890 
The parties in this brief will be referred to as they 
appeared in the lower eourt. 
The Statement of F'acts as contained in plaintiff's 
brief, pages 1 to 4, is accurate and the defendants have: no 
additional facts to p·resent that would aid the Court in 
deciding this case. Based on these· facts, the d~fendants 
contend that the comp·utation of interest by plaintiff is in 
excess of the maximum legal interest allowed under the 
provisions of Section 7-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
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The defendants contend in this brief that the trial 
court did not err and that the judgment of the court 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF' POINT'S 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE NOTE WAS USURIOUS. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
MAKE THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED BY PLAIN-
TIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE NOTE WAS USURIOUS. 
The argument by plaintiff in Points 1, 2 and 3 of its 
brief advances the theory that the trial court in determin-
ing whether the note· in this case was usurious need only 
compute interest from the face of the note·, and if 26'% of 
the face of said note leaves the amount which the defend-
ants received in cash, then the note was not usurious. 
In support of their contention, they have cited the case of 
People's Finance ood Thrift Co. v. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 
285 P. 304. This case is the only authority in.Utah that 
has applied the language of an Industrial Loan Statute 
to a, case- involving a defense of usury. 
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3 
In the Varney case defendants applied to plaintiff for 
a loan in the sum of $200.00, said amount to be repaid 
'Yithin ten months. The Industrial Loan Statute then in 
effect prescribed as the maximum amount of interest 12% 
per annum, and plaintiff therefore deducted 10% of 
$200.00 as interest in advance, and the additional amount 
of $2.00 investigating fee. The defendants· received the 
sum of $178.00 in cash and executed a note payable to 
plaintiff in the sum of $200.00. The defendants defaulted; 
on the note, and upon suit by plaintiff, defended on the 
grounds of usury. The defense of usury was based on 
the ground that defendants did not have the use of $200.00 
for a ten month period, and therefore the: total charge for 
interest for the money.actually loaned to defendants was 
in excess of 12% per annum. The Supreme Court, in 
applying the language of the Industrial Loan Statute 
to the facts, stated the following on page 305 : 
"* * * When therefore the company deducted 
12 per cent per annum as it did .on the face of 
note, as interest in advance for the 10-month peri-
od on the loan, it but did what the statute ex-
pressly authorized such a company to do. The in-
terest deducted was $20, which is the interest on 
$200 for a period of ten months at the rate of 12 
per cent per-annum. * * *" 
The interesting distinction between the Varney case 
and the case at bar is that in the Varney case, the amount 
originally requested by defendants and the face of the 
note is identical, while in the case at bar the amount re-
quested by defendants and the face of the note is not 
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4 
identical. In the situation now before the Court where 
the amount requested by the borrower and the face of the 
note is not identical, the Court must determine upon which 
figure the loan company is permitted to compute its in-
terest. The defendants contend that this figure must be 
f•the original amount requested, which in the case at bar 
L \would also be the actual amount received. If the lender 
is required to compute the interest on this figure and then 
includes this sum in the note, the lender will receive the 
legal rate of interest on the "face of his loan." 
If the face of the note is the figure upon which the 
interest is to be computed, then the borrower is be·ing 
charged for money upon which he neve-r received and 
upon which he· should never be required to pay interest. 
As stated in the case of McCall v. Herrirng, 42 S.E. 469, at 
page 472, the court cited Webb in his treatise on usury 
wherein Mr. Webb stated: 
/\ " 'Interest is compensati?n for ~he use of 
money. If the -amount of the Interest 1s deducted 
: in advance, it is plain that the borrower neve·r uses 
the interest so paid. He does not receive the full 
amount of his loan. He cannot use that which he 
was to receive unless it is paid to him. He cannot 
employ money kept out of his possession. It ren-
ders the borrower no se-rvice, performs no pur-
\Pose, pays no debts, buys no property, satisfies no 
· ·wants,· and accomplishes nothing, as far as the 
borrower is concerned, for which he should be com-
pelled to pay interest.'" 
If the face of the note is the figure upon which ·the 
inte-rest is to be computed, the lender is permitted to 
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5 
charge more than the law .. ful rate of interest. In determin-
ing the rate of interest for a particular loan the case of 
Agostini v. Colonial Trust Co., 36 A. 2d 33, presented a 
formula. The court stated at page 36: 
" 'The term 'interest' is a device of language 
by which a formula is expressed in a word * * * 
There are three elements in the formula and each 
is essential to its proper application. The·y are: 
The amount charged, the amount lent, and the 
time involved. When each element has been ac-
curately determined, application of the formula 
to ascertain the rate of interest charged requires 
merely the use of elementary arithmetic * *. * 
" 'The amount lent means the exact sum of 
which the borrower obtains the actual use. This 
may not be the amount stated in the loan contract. 
Any portion of that stated amount which does not 
come to the borrower .ir~ec of. conditions wl,lich de- ,F ~. 
~--· -~~---.L~--~~- .:..0. ... -~ _<:_ ---~>!(t~ .... -.._1.1· . ·•. ·. --
prive hrm of his beneficial use cannot be included 
in the amount lent for the purpose of computing 
interest. One cannot properly pay for the use of 
something of which one does not have the use * * * 
" 'The time involved means the· exact period 
for which the borrower has the free use of the 
amount lent. Like rent paid for the use of prop-
erty, the rate of charge for the use of money neces-
sarily depends on the length of time it is used. The 
amount of interest charge, in dollars and cents, is 
not legally significant until the amount lent and 
the time involved are known. Only when all three 
factors are known can the rate of charge be com-
puted and reduced to per cent per annum for com-
parison with the rate allowed by law.'" 
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Applying this formula to the case at bar, the amount 
charged is $358.38; the amount lent is the sum of 
$1,020.00, and the time involved is for a twenty-four 
month period. Using simple arithmetic, the interest is 
38% rather than the 26.% allo~ed under the statute. 
There are other authorities that discuss the problem 
of usury and the application of statutes that p-rescribed 
maximum legal interest. 
In Taylor v. Budd, (Cal.) 18 P. 2d 333, the plaintiffs 
borrowed money from the defendants and executed a 
promissory note for one year in the amount of $11,000.00 
secured by a mortgage on real estate. The note contained 
provisions for interest at 12% per annum payable month-
ly in advance. The plaintiffs received the sum of $10,-
670.00. The court, in discussing the question of interest :jl 
in advance and the question as to what should be the test '~ 
for usury, stated as follows, page 334: 
"* * * a note must be tested for usury with a 
reference to the actual sum given by the lender to 
the borrower and not by the mere face of the 
note ; * * *." 
In Co'YI!ner v. Minier (Cal.), 288 P. 23, defendant, 
desiring to borrow the sum of $300.00 from plaintiff, after 
executing two different notes and the plaintiff deducting 
$1.50 for investigating fee, received $270.00 in cash. The· 
defendant then defaulted and upon suit by plaintiff for 
the sum of $300.00 defended on the· grounds of usury. 
The case is not exactly in point because of the complicated 
transaction, but the Court does discuss the problem of 
•
···.t·/" .... · 
I , 
~~ . 
l;,,~ 
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.7 
usury and the computation of interest. At page 25, the 
court states : 
"In the present case all the various papers' 
which we have described are manifestly pa.rts of. 
one transaction by which Minier borrowed money 
from the company, and all must be taken into con-
sideration to determine whether, that loan was 
usurious. On consideration of them all, and of the 
other facts stated, we have no doubt that it was. 
Although Minier signed two notes for $300 each, 
he actually received only $270, in addition to which 
the company paid $1.50 for a financial report. At 
the argument before us, it was stated that the de-
duction of $30 was made up of one year's interest 
on $300 at 6 per cent, amounting to $18, * * * ." 
The court in discussing the difference b~tween the 
$18.00 allowed as interest and the total deduction of $30.00 
stated as follows, page 25 : 
"* * * When interest or commission is de-
ducted in advance from the amount of a loan, in 
testing the transaction for usury, the principal 
sum loaned will be held to be the face amount of 
the loan less the interest or commission so de-
ducted. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage-· Co., 
supra. The total amount loaned in this case, there-
fore, is $271.50." 
I 
Another authority is statement in 66 C.J. 210, which 
states as follows: 
"A contract or obligation for the :eayment of a\\·,. 
sum of money larger than that actually lent to or ' ; 
due from the debtor is usurious if the difference y ~ 
/ ' 
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between the face amount of the obligation and the 
sum actually received or owed by the debtor, when 
added to the interest, if any, stipulated in the con-
tract exceeds the return permitted by law upon 
' . d d * * * " the sum actually so receive or ue, · . 
Another case in point is McKanna v. Thorne (Okla.), 
209 P. 1039. There, the· defendants borrowed from the 
plaintiff the sum of $6,000.00 for a period of five years. 
The maximum amount allowed under the statute was 10%. 
The defendants were required to repay to the plaintiff 
as interest on this $6,000.00 the sum of $3,454.15. The 
court stated at page 1039·: 
"It is clea.r from the notes executed by the de-
fendants that the defendants contracted to pay to 
the plaintiff $454.15 more than the legal rate of 
interest, which the plaintiff was permitted to 
charge the defendants under the law. Ten per cent 
interest being the maximum amount of interest 
which the plaintiff was permitted to charge the de-
fendants for the use of the money, it is obvious 
that, when the plaintiff required the defendants to 
contract to pay him $3,454.15 for the use of $6,-
000.00 for five years, the transaction was tainted 
with usury. The rule applicable to this case is 
stated in Bristow v. Central State Bank (Old. 
Sup.) 173 Pac. 221, as follows: 
'When the lender exacts of the borrower 
as a condition of the loan a sum in addition 
to the highest legal rate of interest the loan 
is thereby tainted with usury and the taint is 
not removed. by giving this charge the· name 
of 'discount'." 
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..~..\nother case in point is Nevels v. Harris (Texas), 
109 A.L.R. 146±, wherein a note was executed in the sum 
of $6,400.00. It was to bear 10% interest from maturity. 
There were other agreements entered into, but for the 
purposes of this case, that point is not important. The 
court states at page 1469: 
"* * * Stolley took a note for $6,400, but he did 
not lend that amount. He, in fact, only loaned $.6,-
±00 l~ss $320, or $6,080. We must therefore treat _. .. 
the last-named figure as the real a1nount of_.the. __ ,V-
~
~~.v.--, 
The court goes on to state: 
"* * * At 10 per cent, the highest legal rate, 
the interest on $6,080 for one year would be $608, 
and 10 per cent interest for the five-year period 
the loan was to run would amount to $3,040. · This 
sum added to the principal actually loaned, $6,080, 
would aggregate $9,120. ·· This last sum is the 
maximum amount Stolley could have· legally 
charged, and unless the contract calls for the pay-
ment of more than that sum it is not usurious." 
The Court will note from these authorities that the 
primary problem in each case was a determination by the 
court to see if the lender received more than the lawful 
rate of interest. If the court so found, the court de-
nounced the practice and held the instrument to be usuri-
ous, regardless of the manner or means by which it was 
accomplished. 
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10 
In the case at bar the facts clearly show that plaintiff 
received an amount in excess of the 26% allowed by the 
statute, and therefore the note is usurious. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
MAKE THE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED BY PLAIN-
TIFF. 
The argument by plaintiff in Point 4 of its brief is 
p·resented to this Court as an excuse of plaintiff for the 
execution of a usurious instrument. All authorities hold 
that a necessary element of a usurious contract is an in-
tent on the part of the lender to exact usurious interest. 
A Utah case that is in point is the case of Cobb v. Harten-
ste:in, 152 P. 424, at page 427: 
"* * *'In deciding whether any given transac-
tion is usurious or not, the courts will disregard 
the form which it may take, and look only to the 
substance of the transaction in order to determine 
whether all the requisites of usury are present. 
These requisites are: (1) An unlawful intent; 
* * *" 
There is an additional rule that is equally established 
and that rule is that if a not.e;is .. usnri;QlilB,·,~nn ~~~~ . .the 
~equireq j;gJ~Jl~implied. In support of this, defend-
ants direct the Court's attention to 55 Am. Jur. 348, and 
further the case of Fagerberg v. Derntnry (Ariz.), 112 P. 2d 
578, wherein the court stated at page 581 : 
"* * * In order to establish usury there must 
be an intent to violate the law. And while when the 
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contract is usurious on its face that intent will be 
presumed. \Vhen it is not, we think the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction are admissible 
to show the true intent." 
The Utah rase of Cobb v. Hartenstein, supra, dis-
cusses this problem at page 430. The court states :. 
~'* * * As we have seen, by the statement of 
the law quoted from Cyc. which we have adopted 
in Flsher v. Adamson, supra, in order to establish 
usury, the existence of an unlawful or corrupt 
purpose is one of the essential elements which 
must be clearly proved to exist at the time the 
contract or transaction which it claims to be usuri-
ous is entered into. Where the contract upon its 
face is usurious, the intention may be inferred an~ 
the inference may be so strong that no express de-
nial can avoid the same." 
Again the defendants assert that under the facts 
presented in this case wherein defendants borrowed the 
sum of. $1,020.00 and executed a note in the sum of 
$1,378.38, this note is usurious on its face. The contract in 
this case was made by plaintiff and it had knowledge qf 
its contents and that it was exacting as interest 38% of 
the amount loaned rather than the 26% allowed ~y 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
In analyzing the brief of the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
has attempted to establish a new p~recedent in construing 
usury statutes. The defendants assert that it would be 
useless and a waste of this Court's time to cite authorities 
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holding these statutes are to be strictly construed. The 
statute involved is specific in stating that the amount of 
interest is 1% per month and this loan being for twenty-
four months, it is elementary that the total interest al-
lowed is 24%. Plaintiff has attempted to convey to this 
Court by its language and cases cited that this statute 
was passed for plaintiff's protection itself and that this 
Court should not construe the statute as a protection to 
the borrower. 
It is difficult for the defendants to conceive that the 
legislature in passing the statute in question drafted a 
bill that could be so tortured and misconstrued that a 
lender could believe he could exact as interest more than 
the legal rate of 1% per month. 
This statute was passed to protect people from the 
clutches of avaricious money lenders rather than throw-
ing them to their mercy. The total amount of interest 
that should be allowed for the use of $1,020.0~ is 26% and 
not 38%. 
The trial court held that the note sued upon by the 
plaintiff was usurious, and the defendants herein contend 
that the trial court's findings were correct and that the 
judgment of said eourt should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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